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ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED 
CHILD: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE SPERM DONOR 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, Gayle Burns became pregnant through artificial 
insemination using the preserved sperm of her husband, who died 
from cancer two years earlier. 1 In his contractual agreement with the 
reproductive clinic, Michael Burns indicated his intent to prevent 
destruction of his sperm in the event of his death, his consent to 
assisted reproduction, and his desire to give his wife legal rights to 
his sperm upon his death.2 Gayle acknowledged their discussion 
about having children and her husband's hope for her to conceive his 
child upon his death; he had even purchased a life insurance policy to 
provide for Gayle and their child.3 
Despite Michael's proactive efforts to make known his intent to 
father a child posthumously, Gayle was initially denied social 
security benefits when she applied on behalf of their son.4 The 
decision was subsequently reversed, but then reversed again based on 
Utah's prohibition of payments to posthumously conceived children 
(PCC).5 Although Utah law requires the sperm donor to record his 
intent to "'parent' a child conceived through assisted reproduction ... 
in order to later be legally" recognized as the father, Michael's intent 
has thus far been ignored.6 If the completed consent form and 
purchase of a life-insurance policy for the benefit of his future child 
were insufficient to declare Michael Burns' intent to parent and 
financially support the posthumously conceived child, it is difficult to 
imagine what additional hurdles might be imposed upon the donor 
during his lifetime to ensure his intent is carried out and the 
posthumously conceived child's inheritance rights are protected.7 
Gayle Burns may have avoided the extensive litigation she has 
undertaken to secure benefits for her son if Utah's statute allowed the 
1. Jennifer Dobner, Utah High Court to Hear Posthumous Benefits Case, DESERET NEWS 







7. See id. 
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decedent's intent to govern in particular circumstances, thereby 
protecting the class of PCC born to donors who complied with the 
requisite statutory formalities. 8 A signed, written, and witnessed 
consent form that could not be contested without liability for legal 
fees and court-mandated acceptance would eliminate the need to rely 
on oral testimony from the family as to the decedent's intent. 9 
Further, when a donor engages in estate planning during his lifetime 
for the purpose of financially providing for the after-born, whether a 
source of funds exists for the child's inheritance will be ascertainable 
at the donor's death, and such planning will reinforce his intent for 
the posthumous conception to occur, as indicated by the consent 
form. 10 
Cryopreservation and assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are 
often utilized by young, childless couples who are drained by their 
medical expenses and fail to engage in estate planning, II thereby 
amplifying the need for a statute that identifies the inheritance rights 
of these PCC and informs the donors of the requisite steps they must 
take to ensure their intent is carried OUt. 12 However, even if there are 
no assets in the decedent's estate to which the child could bring a 
claim, a consent form stipulating the donor's intent would be relevant 
to determine whether the after-born child may inherit through the 
estates of the decedent's relatives, or as a class member in their estate 
plans. 13 
Under the Social Security Act and the Supreme Court's Capato 
decision, PCC are only entitled to receive social security survivor 
benefits if the after-born heirs are eligible to inherit under the 
intestacy laws of the state where the wage earner was domiciled. 14 In 
light of this need for an unambiguous declaration of PCC's 
8. See id.; infra Part IV.A. 
9. See Dobner, supra note 1; cf MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 17-104 (LexisNexis 
2011) (imposing a court order and sanctions on any person who refuses to accept an 
acknowledged, statutory power of attorney). 
10. See infra Part IV.E. 
11. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
Many couples resort to these techniques due to the diagnosis of a serious illness or the 
need for a treatment that can cause infertility. Dlv. OF REPROD. HEALTH, NAT'L CTR. 
FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, 2009 AsSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY 
CLINIC REpORTS 34 (2011). 
12. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). State 
intestacy statutes govern the disposition of an individual's probate property when the 
decedent dies without a will. ANGELA M. VALLARIO, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ESTATE 
PLANNING 5 (2012); see also EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-101 to 3-105. 
13. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1260. 
14. See infra notes 75-80, 86-90 and accompanying text. 
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inheritance rights under state law, the increasing use of reproductive 
technology and incidence of PCC,15 and the extensive litigation 
spotlighting PCC and their right to insurance benefits,16 Maryland's 
General Assembly repealed and reenacted Maryland's after-born 
heirs statute in 2012.17 The amended law confers inheritance rights 
upon PCC born within two years of the decedent's death if the donor 
provided written consent for the posthumous conception to occur and 
written consent to be the parent of the posthumously conceived 
child. IS While there has been no litigation in Maryland to date by 
PCC seeking an award of insurance benefits, the amended statute 
should allow PCC to recover social security survivor benefits if the 
donor provided the requisite consent and the child is born within the 
statute of limitations period, as these PCC would be eligible to inherit 
under Maryland's intestacy law. 19 Yet despite this attempt to stem 
the uncertainty as to whether PCC are entitled to social security 
funds, the law fails to adequately protect the inheritance ric;hts of 
PCC, and may likewise fail to secure their insurance benefits.2 
This comment aims to illustrate why Maryland's intestacy statute is 
unsatisfactory and should be amended again to enumerate the 
circumstances under which PCC, conceived from banked sperm after 
the father's death, may inherit through their deceased father's estate.21 
The proposed statute would apply only when a decedent dies intestate 
or a testator bequeaths property to "my children;,,22 however, the 
statute would not be implicated when a testator names his spouse as 
the sole legatee of his estate plan.23 Part II discusses the reproductive 
technology that has allowed children to be born years after the 
father's death, developments in Maryland and federal law related to 
the inheritance rights of PCC, and the inadequacy of Maryland's 
current after-born heirs statute. Part III explains why PCC should 
only be entitled to inherit from the deceased parent's estate in limited 
15. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002); see 
discussion infra Part II.A. 
16. See discussion infra Part n.c. 
17. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107; H.B. 101, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2012 Md. Laws 
4330-33. The previous law only allowed children conceived prior to the decedent's 
death to inherit from the estate, even if bom after that parent's death. See discussion 
infra Part II.B.1. 
18. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107. 
19. See infra Part II.B.2; notes 80, 86-90 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 60-69, 91-96 and accompanying text. 
21. See discussion infra Parts n.B.3, IV.A. 
22. See infra note 102. 
23. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
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circumstances, considering the interests of others affected by these 
new heirs. Part IV proposes a solution whereby Maryland donors 
would complete a consent form at the time of the donation, creating a 
signed, written, and witnessed record that expresses the intent for the 
posthumous reproduction to occur and the desire to financially 
provide for the child. While the proposed statute would maintain a 
presumption against inheritance rights for PCC, the donor may rebut 
this presumption by complying with these statutory formalities during 
his lifetime to unequivocally indicate his intent.24 Lastly, in order to 
secure inheritance rights for his after-born child and a timely 
resolution of his estate, the proposed statute would require the donor 
to engage in estate planning during his lifetime to ensure a source of 
funds for the child's inheritance.25 For example, the creation of an 
inter vivos or testamentary trust for the benefit of the donor's wife 
during her lifetime and then to his children would satisfy this final 
statutory requirement. 26 Such clearly manifested intent could hardly 
be contested.27 
II. ALTHOUGH MARYLAND LAW ADDRESSES THE 
INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF AFTER-BORN HEIRS, THE 
PREVALENCE OF NON-TRADITIONAL METHODS OF 
CONCEPTION AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THESE PCC 
REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL AMENDMENT OF 
MARYLAND'S STATUTE 
A. Due to Developments in the Field of Reproductive Technology, 
Conception is Increasingly Occurring via Non-Traditional 
Methods and Years After One Parent's Death 
In anticipation of Warren Woodward's leukemia treatment, he and 
his wife arranged to bank his sperm.28 Two years after Warren's 
death, Lauren Woodward gave birth to twin girls who were 
"conceived through artificial insemination using the. . . preserved 
semen."29 Recognizing the potential for posthumous reproduction to 
occur under a "variety of conditions" and "implicate other fmnly 
established State and individual interests," the court rejected the idea 
24. See discussion infra Part IV. 
25. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
26. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
28. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002). 
29. Id. 
2012] A Blueprint for the Spenn Donor 185 
of using any bright-line rule to determine the inheritance rights of 
pee, absent a legislative directive.30 
Homologous inseminations raise concerns different than those 
presented by heterologous inseminations/1 but that likewise should 
be addressed through written agreements.32 When children are born 
to the surviving parent or partner from the decedent's stored semen 
specimens, the issue becomes whether pee may inherit from the 
deceased father's estate.33 However, a simple, bright-line rule that 
grants the child a right to the money raises practical concerns that 
would make such a solution administratively impracticable.34 
With scientific advancements that preserve the viability of sperm 
and eggs years after their collection, Maryland must implement 
further amendments to its 2012 legislative framework that keep pace 
with this rapidly developing field in order to reduce uncertainty about 
the legal rights of pee.35 Various techniques manipulate the eggs, 
30. Id. at 262. 
31. See Jacqueline Mroz, From One Sperm Donor, 150 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2011, at D1. Heterologous insemination refers to insemination by an anonymous 
donor. Lucy R. Dollens, Note, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the 
Difficulty in Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REv. 213, 214 (2001). With 
recent heterologous inseminations, sperm specimens from a single donor can yield 
more than 150 offspring. Mroz, supra. While anonymous donors routinely sign 
written waivers with the sperm bank to preclude paternity claims by the children born 
from the banked sperm, Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 848 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993), "unintended consanguinity" can create problems for offspring who are 
unknowingly related to one another but live nearby, potentially dating and engaging in 
accidental incest. Mroz, supra, at D6. Some sperm banks address this problem by 
limiting the number of births or units sold originating from a single donor and 
monitoring the geographic distribution of the children born from each donor. See, 
e.g., Limitations on Donor Births, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://fairfaxcryobank.coml 
ReadFirst.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
32. See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, 
CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES, http://www.cryolab.comlforms.shtml (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012). Maryland's current after-born heirs law targets homologous inseminations, to 
the exclusion of heterologous inseminations. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 3-107 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
33. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the 
Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, I lL. & HEALTH 229, 244 (1985-87). 
34. See discussion infra Part 1I1.A. For example, how long should the estate remain open 
for? See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. What amount of assets should be 
reserved for the inheritance? See infra Part lIlA. How can a sufficient inheritance be 
sheltered for additional PCC born in the future? See infra Part 1I1.A. How can the 
inheritance of any children born during the decedent's lifetime be preserved and 
protected? See infra Part 1I1.A. 
35. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 33, at 233. 
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spenn, or both in order to increase fertility rates.36 Still considered 
experimental because of its low success rate, oocyte cryopreservation 
is the freezing of a woman's eggs prior to fertilization. 37 Because 
only about 900 babies have been born to date from frozen eggs, 
whereas hundreds of thousands have been born from frozen spenn, 
this comment focuses on the ramifications of children posthumously 
conceived from banked sperm.38 
Cryopreservation of sperm involves freezing the specimens at 
temperatures nearly minus 200 degrees Celsius and storing them in 
liquid nitrogen, sometimes for many years.39 These non-traditional 
methods are used when medical treatment or disease, environmental 
toxins, or a pre-existing medical condition threatens the quality or 
production of the spenn and thereby creates a risk of reduced fertility 
or sterility.40 
36. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech Child 
of the 21" Century, 43 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. LJ. 393, 395 (2008). Whereas only the 
sperm is handled in artificial insemination, ART involves the surgical removal of a 
woman's eggs from her ovaries. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, I, http://www.cdc.gov/ART (last 
updated Aug. 1,2012). 
37. Oocyte Storage (Egg Freezing), FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfax 
cryobank.comiOocyteStorage.shtml (last visited Dec. 11, 2012); Egg Freezing for 
Medical Indications, NYU LANGONE MEDICAL CENTER, NYU FERTILITY CENTER, 
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.orglegg_freezinglmedical (last visited Dec. 11,2012). 
38. Egg Freezing for Medical Indications, supra note 37; Cyropreservation Information 
Brochure, PITTSBURGH CRYOBANK, 1, http://www.pittsburghcryobank.coml 
cryoinfo.pdf(last updated Feb. 28, 2003). 
39. Sperm Banking, Keeping Hopes Alive, CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES, http:// 
www.cryolab.comlpdflCLI%20Sperm%20Banking%20Brochure.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2012). Some scientists discovered the ability to preserve sperm stem cells 
for more than a century. Amy L. Komoroski, Comment, After Woodward v. 
Commissioner of Social Services: Where do Posthumously Conceived Children Stand 
in the Line of Descent?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 297 (2002). 
40. Sperm Banking, Keeping Hopes Alive, supra note 39. Cryopreservation is commonly 
used by men who receive a diagnosis of testicular or prostate cancer, work in an 
occupation that exposes them to harmful chemicals or pollutants, desire insurance 
prior to undergoing a vasectomy, or suffer from oligozoospermia, a condition 
characterized by a low sperm count or sperm of poor quality. Id. If a man suffers 
from oligozoospermia, "banking consecutive specimens of semen" creates a 
concentrated deposit and ensures availability for use at critical times during the 
reproductive process. Homologous Artificial Insemination, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 154, 155 
(1978). Oocyte cryopreservation is used for similar reasons, or by women who want 
to conceive at a later time but wish to preserve their eggs during their reproductive 
prime. Oocyte Cyropreservation Program and Success Rates, NYU LANGONE 
MEDICAL CENTER, NYU FERTILITY CENTER, http://www.nyufertilitycenter.orgl 
egg_freezinglsuccess_rates (last visited Dec. 11,2012). 
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Because frozen sperm can be preserved for at least ten years,41 
Maryland's intestacy statute outlining the disposition of property 
must establish a more comprehensive framework to reconcile the 
competing interests of an efficient estate administration process and 
the protection of the inheritance rights of these PCC, who effectively 
are not recognized as descendants of the donor for inheritance 
purposes unless the donor complied with the statutory consent 
requirements and the children were born within two years of the 
decedent's death.42 
B. Despite Efforts to Expand the Legal Rights o/PCC, Maryland's 
After-Born Heirs Law Remains Inadequate 
1. Maryland Previously Restricted Inheritance Rights to Children 
Conceived During the Decedent's Lifetime 
Prior to its amendment in 2012, Maryland's after-born heirs statute 
allowed a child conceived during the decedent's lifetime-even if the 
child was born subsequent to the decedent's death-to inherit from 
that parent's estate.43 However, this law precluded the growing class 
of PCC from inheriting from the deceased parent's estate, thereby 
preventing these after-born heirs from attaining legal status equal to 
those children conceived during both parents' lifetimes.44 
2. Current Law Expands the Inheritance Rights ofPCC 
The enactment of House Bill 101, effective October 1, 2012, 
expands the potential for PCC to inherit through the decedent. 45 First, 
Maryland revised the definition of a child to include PCC of 
decedents who consented in writing for the posthumous conception to 
occur, in accordance with the requirements of section 20-111, and 
41. Jamie Rowsell, Stayin' Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41 
FAM. CT. REv. 400,401 (2003). 
42. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-111 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); see also discussion infra Parts 
III.A., IV.A. 
43. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2011) (amended 2012). 
44. See id. In 2009, the number of children who were born and conceived using ART 
nearly doubled from those born in 2000. NAT'L eTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE 
PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 11, at 65. 
45. EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205(a)(2), 3-107. The new law affects three Maryland statutes, 
amending sections 1-205 (defining who constitutes a child) and 3-107 (providing 
which PCC are entitled to inherit under state intestacy law), and adding section 20-
111 (describing the consent formalities). H.B. 101, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 
2012 Md. Laws 4330-32. 
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provided written consent to be the parent of the posthumously 
conceived child.46 Maryland also overhauled its after-born heirs law. 
The amended statute retains the provision allowing a child conceived 
during the decedent's lifetime, but born subsequent to that parent's 
death, to inherit from that estate.47 Moreover, PCC are entitled to 
inherit as children under the state's intestacy laws if: (1) the donor 
consented to the use of his genetic material towards posthumous 
conception in a writing signed by the donor, or signed by another 
person in the donor's presence and at his express direction, on or 
after October 1, 2012; (2) the donor provided written consent to be 
the parent of the posthumously conceived child; and (3) the child is 
born within two years of the decedent's death.48 
3. Despite Increased Recognition ofPCC and Their Inheritance 
Rights, Maryland's Statutes are Unsatisfactory 
While the legislation signifies awareness of the need to clarify the 
law,49 shortcomings in the statutes create the potential for litigation. 50 
First, the statutory formalities are inadequate. 51 Without requiring the 
donor-or other person signing in his presence and at his direction-
to create the writing before a notary public or other witnesses, the law 
causes concern of fraud and forgery. 52 Second, while the previous 
law required revision because it indiscriminately foreclosed an 
increasing number of children from receiving inheritance benefits, 53 
the temporal restriction in the current law will likely have the same 
effect, since only children born within two years of the decedent's 
death will be entitled to inherit.54 In fact, stipulating a two-year 
period risks delaying administration of the estate, thus conflicting 
46. EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205(a)(2), 20-1 11 (b), (c). 
47. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(a). 
48. Id. §§ 3-107(b), 20-1 11 (c). The law prohibits a person from using a known donor's 
sperm for the purpose of assisted reproduction after the donor's death without the 
donor's prior written and signed consent. Id. §§ 20-1 1 1 (bHc). Individuals who use 
the genetic material of a donor who they know died and did not consent to the 
posthumous use of his sperm are guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine. Id. §§ 
20-1 11 (b), (d). 
49. H.B. 101, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2012 Md. Laws 4430-42. 
50. See infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text. 
51. See EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b)(l), 20-1 11 (c); infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
A previous version of the House Bill required the donor's written consent to be 
acknowledged before a notary public, but this provision was stricken. H.B. 101, 
430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (as introduced to the Comm. on Health 
and Gov't Operations, Jan. 19,2012). 
52. See EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107 (b)(l), 20-111(c); infra Part IV.B. 
53. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
54. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b). 
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with the goal of a simple probate process. 55 A personal representative 
who postpones distributing the estate pending the two-year period to 
ensure no PCC are born compromises this desired efficiency. 56 
Alternatively, a personal representative who distributed assets prior 
to the enactment of the law could be deemed to have done so 
inappropriately if a child is born within two years after the decedent's 
death.57 
Several inconsistencies in the statutes will foster uncertainty about 
the inheritance rights of PCC. While the law mandates that the 
donor's consent for the posthumous use of his sperm be in 
accordance with the requirements of section 20-111, these same 
formalities are not imposed upon the donor's written consent to be 
the parent of the child. 58 Moreover, though the law will not apply 
retroactively,s9 it nonetheless has the potential to affect trusts already 
in existence. By declining to acknowledge the validity of consent 
given prior to October 1, 2012, even donors who complied with the 
statutory consent requirements during their lifetime may not have 
their intent honored.60 However, the law fails to likewise condition 
its application to estates and trusts created on or after October 1, 
2012, possibly impacting those created prior to this date. 61 
Yet the most litigious aspect is the inconsistency between the 
statute of limitations provision in the after-born heirs statute and the 
absence of such a limitations period in the section pertaining to these 
after-born heirs in the "Definition of Child" statute. 62 While the 
former imposes a two-year statute of limitations period, during which 
time the child must be born in order to inherit through the deceased 
parent's estate, the latter fails to incorporate this same two-year 
requirement. 63 For example, a posthumously conceived child born 
55. EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105; see also infra Part III.A. 
56. See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105; infra Part lILA. 
57. See EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(3); see also EST. & TRUSTS § IO-103(b)(l) (allowing an 
individual to recover for the improper distribution of property). 
58. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b), 20-11I(c). Section 20-lll(c) requires that the 
consent be in writing and signed by the donor, or signed by another person in the 
donor's presence and at his express direction. Id. § 20-III(c). 
59. See id. §§ 3-107(b), 20-11 I (c) (providing that consent given on or after October I, 
2012, will be held valid if the statutory formalities are satisfied). 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. Compare id. § 3-107(b)(3) (requiring after-born heirs to be born within two years of 
the decedent's death to be eligible to inherit), with id. § 1-205(a)(2) (failing to provide 
a statute of limitations in defining which PCC will be considered a child within the 
meaning of the statute). 
63. /d. §§ 1-205(a)(2), 3-107(b)(3). 
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three years after the decedent's death would be barred from 
inheritance benefits under section 3-1D7(b), but could be determined 
to be a child within the meaning of section 1-205(a)(2), where there 
is no operative statute of limitations.64 Because the Social Security 
Act looks to state intestacy law in determining "who is a 'child '" and 
thus entitled to survivor benefits,65 reliance on section 1-205(a)(2) 
could yield the conclusion that the child is entitled to social security 
benefits, notwithstanding the conflicting after-born heirs statute, 
which would deem that same child ineligible to inherit from the 
decedent's probate estate.66 Because it is unclear which statute will 
control in determining whether pee are eligible for social security 
benefits,67 both statutes should have parallel language and consistent 
requirements to avoid ambiguities. 
c. PCC are Only Entitled to Social Security Survivor Benefits 
Where State Intestacy Law Confers Inheritance Rights upon 
These Children 
To date, the issue of inheritance rights for pee has arisen in the 
context of social security benefit claims.68 In these cases, the benefits 
derive from assets already set aside as a function of the wage earner's 
lifetime contributions into the social security system.69 Thus, the 
funds are transferred outside of the probate process according to 
operation oflaw.70 pee inheriting from the decedent's probate estate 
present a distinguishable situation: any assets titled solely in the 
donor's name are probate assets that will be subject to the estate 
administration process and will pass according to the terms of his 
64. See id. 
65. Astrue v. Capato ex reI. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021,2026,2032 (2012). 
66. See EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205(a)(2), 3-107(b). 
67. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2032-33. 
68. See. e.g., Beeler v. Astrue,651 F.3d 954, 956-57 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 
641 F.3d 49,51 (4th Cir. 2011); Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 
260-61 (Mass. 2002). 
69. Survivors Planner: How Much Would Your Survivors Receive? Soc. SECURITY, 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/survivorplanlonyourown5.htm (last modified Apr. 24, 
2012); see also cases cited supra note 68. 
70. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 18, 69; Survivors Planner: How Much Would Your 
Survivors Receive?, supra note 69; Survivors Planner: How You Apply for Survivors 
Benefits, Soc. SECURITY, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/survivorplanl 
howtoapply.htm#ht=1 (last modified Mar. 30, 2012) (explaining that the Social 
Security Administration handles survivor benefits claims). Other nonprobate 
arrangements include trusts, life insurance, retirement accounts, and joint bank 
accounts. VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 18. Title to these assets "passes automatically 
by contract, by operation of law, or by inter vivos transfer outside the probate 
administration process." ld. 
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will; if the donor dies intestate, the probate assets are distributed 
pursuant to the state's intestacy laws. 7l However, if the donor creates 
a trust for the benefit of his after-born child, any funds allocated to 
the trust would constitute nonprobate assets that would pass 
according to the terms of the instrument. 72 
Until recently, jurisdictions were split as to whether PCC were 
entitled to inherit from the deceased parent in the context of social 
security benefits.73 The divergence of opinion stemmed from 
whether an after-born child is a "child" within the meaning of the 
Social Security Act and therefore entitled to survivor benefits. 74 An 
internal manual for employees contains an explicit provision 
pertaining to children conceived after the wage earner's death.75 The 
section states that "[ a] child conceived by artificial means" 
posthumously cannot inherit, unless "he or she has inheritance rights 
under applicable State intestacy law.,,76 The variance amongst 
circuits was due to the Social Security Administration's deference to 
each state's intestacy statutes in determining who constitutes a 
"child" within the meaning of the statutory language. 77 Thus, a 
posthumously conceived child is only an eligible applicant for social 
71. VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 69. 
72. See id. 
73. See cases cited supra note 68. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of 
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to ultimately 
decide the issue. Capato ex rei. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626,627, 
632 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rei. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 
576 (2011) (No. 11-159), rev'd 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
74. 42 U.S.c. §§ 402(d), 416(e) (2006). The Ninth Circuit held that posthumously 
conceived twins were entitled to social security benefits, construing both the Act and 
the meaning of "dependency" liberally. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371F.3d 593, 
598-99 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rei. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 
(2012). There, the Court acknowledged that although Arizona law lacks a statute 
specifically applicable to PCC, all children are the legitimate children of their natural 
parents. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599. In Estate of Kolacy, the court also 
acknowledged the void in New Jersey's laws concerning posthumous conception, 
ultimately deciding that the after-born twins were legal heirs under the intestacy laws. 
In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1263-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
Extrapolating the legislative intent for children to inherit from and through their 
parents, and the decedent's intent for his wife to bear his children, the court also 
adopted a liberal reading of the legislative posture. Id. at 1262, 1264. 
75. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM: SECTION GN 
00306.001C(C)(I) DETERMINING STATUS AS A CHILD (Oct. 21, 2008), available at 
https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsfllnxl0200306001. 
76. Id. 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). 
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security benefits if the child would be an heir under the intestacy laws 
in the state where the insured wage earner was domiciled at death. 78 
Maryland courts have yet to weigh in on PCC's entitlement to 
social security survivor benefits. However, the Fourth Circuit held in 
Schafer v. Astrue that the posthumously conceived child was not 
entitled to social security survivor benefits because the child was not 
an heir under Virginia's intestacy law. 79 This court and other courts 
denying benefits to after-born children have applied Chevron 
deference-allowing a government agency's reasonable 
interpretation of a statute it administers to prevail when the statute is 
ambiguous or silent on an issue8°-to uphold the Social Security 
Administration's interpretation of the statute, despite acknowledging 
a range of feasible interpretations or even more reasonable ones. 81 
Notwithstanding the recent amendments to Maryland's laws,82 the 
remaining states comprising the Fourth Circuit preclude PCC from 
inheriting under state intestacy law unless conceived during the 
decedent's lifetime.83 
On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court denied Robert Capato's 
posthumously conceived twins from inheriting social security 
survivor benefits. 84 In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, the Court afforded Chevron deference to the Social Security 
Administration's interpretation of the Social Security Act and held 
that the PCC are only entitled to social security survivor benefits if 
78. !d. 
79. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011). Virginia intestacy law was 
determinative because the decedent was domiciled there at the time of his death. Id. 
at 51-52. 
80. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984). 
81. See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954,959 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54. 
A logical interpretation of the word "child" could include any biological children, 
including those only born after a parent's death due to unfortunate circumstances. 
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54. 
82. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
83. In Virginia, only children conceived before the decedent's death are entitled to inherit. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.1 (2007). Although children born from assisted conception 
after the decedent's death may inherit if determined to be a relative of the decedent, 
the statute is silent as to whether these offspring must be conceived prior to the 
decedent's death. Id. West Virginia requires the child be conceived during the 
decedent's lifetime in order to inherit from the decedent's estate. W. VA. CODE § 42-
1-8 (2010). North and South Carolina both allow the decedent's issue to inherit if 
born within ten months of the death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 62-2-108 (2007). 
84. See Astrue v. Capato ex rei. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2023, 2026 (2012). It is 
undisputed that these children are the biological children of the decedent. Brief in 
Opposition at 5, Capato ex rei. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) 
(No. 11-159). 
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they are eligible to inherit under state intestacy law.85 Since states 
vary in their treatment of after-born heirs, whether PCC are entitled 
to survivor benefits will ultimately hinge upon the law of the state 
where the decedent was domiciled.86 Because Florida's after-born 
heirs statute limits inheritance rights to children conceived during the 
decedent's lifetime,87 Capato's posthumously conceived twins, born 
eighteen months after his death, were barred from receiving 
benefits. 88 
In light of Capalo, Maryland's amended intestacy scheme has a 
two-fold effect. 89 First, a posthumously conceived child is 
recognized as a "child" under Maryland law if the donor complied 
with the statutory consent requirements, without regard to when the 
child is born relative to the decedent's death.90 Next, PCC are 
prohibited from inheriting as heirs of the decedent's estate, unless the 
donor complied with the statutory consent requirements and the child 
is born within two years of the donor's death. 91 Because state 
intestacy law governs in determining if a posthumously conceived 
child is entitled to social security benefits,92 whether the after-born 
heirs law or the definition of a child controls may result in different 
outcomes.93 However, after-born heirs will only have inheritance 
rights to the decedent's estate if their surviving parent conceives 
quickly enough to provide the child with statutory protection.94 
85. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34. The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of 
the Social Security Act is to protect those relatives who were dependent upon the 
wage earner during his lifetime, and moreover, Congress could not have anticipated 
the current reproductive technology when the Act was originally enacted or amended, 
in 1939 and 1965, respectively. Id. at 2026. 
86. See id. at 2032; compare CAL. PROB.CODE § 249.5 (West Supp. 2012) (allowing PCC . 
to inherit if the decedent and the individual designated to control the genetic material 
comply with statutory formalities), with sources cited supra note 83 (providing state 
intestacy statutes that deny inheritance rights to PCC). 
87. FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (West 2010). 
88. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2025-26. 
89. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205,3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
90. See EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-205(a)(2) (failing to provide a statute of limitations in 
stipulating which PCC are included in the definition of a child); Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 
2032. Social security benefits are conferred to an individual recognized as a "child" 
under the state's intestacy law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(h)(2)(A) (2006); see also 
supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
91. EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b), 20-111. 
92. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
93. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
94. See EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b). 
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III. TO ADVANCE THE LEGISLATIVE GOAL OF 
STREAMLINING THE ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 
PROCESS AND EFFECTUATING THE DECEDENT'S 
INTENT, PCC SHOULD ONLY BE ENTITLED TO INHERIT 
FROM THE DECEASED PARENT'S ESTATE UNDER 
LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. Establishing a Bright-Line Rule Granting Inheritance Rights to 
All PCC Would Frustrate the Probate Goals of Administrative 
Convenience and Affect the Inheritance of Other Beneficiaries or 
Heirs Entitled to Take Under Will or Intestacy 
Allowing PCC to claim an inheritance from the deceased parent's 
estate creates a myriad of dilemmas for legislators, families, and 
estate planners.95 In rejecting a bright-line approach either granting 
or denying inheritance rights for all PCC, the Woodward court 
attempted to balance these interests. 96 The court identified the state 
concerns as protecting the child's interests, preserving the 
reproductive rights of the deceased genetic parent, and efficiently 
administering the estate, including "preventing fraudulent claims 
against the estate. ,,97 
In fact, a bright-line rule that grants inheritance rights to all PCC 
would protract the estate administration process, since multiple 
children could be conceived many years after the decedent's death. 98 
The potential for several births generates greater uncertainty: the 
personal representative cannot predict what amount of the decedent's 
assets should be reserved for the unborn and unascertained heirs, and 
this in tum would delay the distribution of any nonspecific bequests 
to the known heirs.99 Moreover, the estate would need to remain 
open for an indefinite period until each child is born and capable of 
95. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Soc. SEC., REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN 
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, ClIUld. 9314, at 4-7, 55 (U.K.). Thepurpose 
of the report was to consider ethical issues arising in the field and to present potential 
legislation. Id. at 1, 55. 
96. Woodward v. Cornm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262,264-65 (Mass. 2002). 
97. Id. at 264-66. 
98. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.I. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
99. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (LexisNexis 2011). A specific bequest is 
a testamentary transfer of a particular item and is most protected if there are 
insufficient assets at the testator's death to implement all provisions of the will. See 
EST. & TRUSTS § 9-103(b)(7); VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 88-89. 
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inheriting. loo Failing to wrap up the estate within a certain time frame 
would frustrate the legislative intent and the goals of the probate 
laws, which seek to provide an efficient, prompt administrative 
process and to minimize estate expenses. 101 
A statute mandating that PCC receive a fixed dollar amount or 
percentage, either based on the value of the probate estate or based on 
an elaborate framework accounting for both probate and nonprobate 
assets, would provide an unworkable solution. 102 The personal 
representative would still be confronted with the uncertainties of the 
number of PCC that could eventually be born and the amount to 
reserve for their inheritances. 103 If the surviving parent chooses to 
conceive five years after her husband's death, or has difficulty 
becoming pregnant immediately, the administration of the decedent's 
estate would be stalled and other heirs would be unable to claim their 
shares. 104 Alternatively, if a child were born several years after the 
estate has been settled, the statute oflimitations would make it nearly 
impossible to reclaim assets that have already been distributed. l05 
Furthermore, if the mother opts to have multiple children from the 
cryopreserved specimens, the estate would need to remain open until 
all PCC are born so each could be assured an inheritance. \06 Only 
after all after-born children come into being could the estate be 
distributed and settled.107 . Finally, because intestacy laws only 
become relevant when a person dies without a will-or with a will 
that is invalid or incomplete-there will be uncertainty as to whether 
the decedent intended the after-born child to be born or to inherit 
from his estate and hold equal status to those children born during his 
lifetime. 108 This inability to predict the decedent's intent could 
prompt claims and delay the estate administration process by 
100. See In re Estate of Koiacy, 753A.2d at 1262. This scenario would apply if the 
decedent dies intestate or if the testator named his children as legatees with a class 
designation, such as "my children." See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 82. 
101. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ I-lOS, 7-101, 10-103; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266. For 
example, keeping the estate open indefinitely would increase expenses by prolonging 
the period for which commissions are paid to the executor or corporate trustee of a 
trust, ultimately reducing the inheritance of the heirs. 
102. But cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010); EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-102 to 103 
(providing the method for apportioning the decedent's estate to the surviving spouse 
and issue). 
103. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
104. See EsT. & TRUSTS § 7-101; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 268. 
105. EST. & TRUSTS § 10-103. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98. 
108. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-101. 
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involving extrinsic evidence to shed light on the decedent's intent. I09 
Gayle Bums' attempt to secure benefits for her son exemplifies this 
process, as the oral record consisting of the decedent's conversations 
with his wife and family about wanting to become a father will be of 
paramount importance in establishing his intent. 11O 
B. A Donor May Use a Consent Form That Complies with the 
Statutory Formalities to Give Disposition Instructions for His 
Stored Semen Specimens 
The Food and Drug Administration regulates the donation of 
human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products, and 
sperm banks must comply with particular registration, recordkeeping, 
and donor screening requirements. II I However, s8erm bank consent 
forms are not uniform and vary in their language. 1 
If the donor indicates his intent for the disposition of the sperm 
specimens upon his death, the bequest should be carried out as long 
as he complied with the statutory requirements of a signed, witnessed 
writing. 113 The formalities encompassed in a consent form would be 
akin to those required for a valid will and would allow the donor to 
express his intent at the time of the sperm donation. 114 Because of the 
presumption against inheritance rights for PCC, a donor who fails to 
comply with these formalities or indicates that the stored specimens 
be destroyed upon his death would simply waive the child's right to 
inherit through his estate. 115 
Yet in order for a bequest of banked sperm to be found valid, such 
specimens must be bequeathable. 1I6 The property dimension of 
sperm specimens was considered but dismissed by a French court in 
one of the first cases involving post-mortem insemination.117 There, 
the family of a French citizen brought a breach of contract claim 
against a sperm bank that refused to deliver the banked specimens to 
the decedent's widow. liS Acknowledging that the arcane laws did not 
contemplate modem methods of reproduction, the court nonetheless 
declined to accept the plaintiffs' contention that the specimens were a 
109. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269-70. 
110. Dobner, supra note 1. 
111. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.1-3, 127.55 (2012). 
112. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. 
113. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
114. See EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102; see infra Part IV.B. 
115. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
116. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18, 121-23. 
117. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 33, at 229-32. 
118. [d. at 229-30. 
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bailed, material good that must be returned to the bailor's heir upon 
the bailor's death. 1l9 Refusing to qualify the spenn specimens as 
inheritable property or to consider property rights, the court held that 
the decedent's intent should be the deciding factor, citing the special 
relationship between spenn and the individual's fundamental right to 
choose to conceive. 120 
Almost ten years after the French court refused to consider that 
property rights should affect the disposition of banked semen 
specimens upon their donor's death, a California court established 
that such specimens are in fact "a unique type of 'property'" and 
bequeathable.121 In Hecht v. Kane, the Court held that although not 
joined to an egg at the time, the deceased donor's banked semen 
specimens constituted "property," due to their potential to create 
life. 122 
The case was distinguishable from Moore v. Regents of University 
of California, in which Moore was unsuccessful in his conversion 
claim when the physician performing Moore's leukemia treatment 
used his excised cells for medical research without Moore's 
permission. 123 The Moore court decided that the patient failed to 
retain a sufficient ownership interest in the cells or to maintain an 
expectation of possession of the cells after their removal to warrant a 
conversion claim. 124 However, in elevating the semen specimens to 
property-like status, the Hecht court found the decedent had an 
ownership interest and retained "decision-making authority as to the 
use of his sperm for reproduction" at the time of his death.125 Though 
the court did not assess the validity of the decedent's will or the 
contract concerning the disposition of the semen, the decision 
provided that the specimens can be included in the estate and, 
consequently, disposed of according to the decedent's intent. 126 
Because stored semen specimens are a bequeathable part of the. _ 
decedent's estate, a form that disposes ofthis property and complies 
with the signed, witnessed writing formalities should be given 
effect. 127 
119. ld. at 232. 
120. ld. at 232-33. 
121. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); 
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 33, at 230, 233. 
122. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. 
123. Moore v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480-81 (Cal. 1990). 
124. ld. at 488-89. 
125. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. 
126. See id. at 283-84. 
127. See id. at 283; supra Part III.B. 
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IV. MARYLAND'S STATUTE SHOULD CREATE A 
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INHERITANCE BUT ALLOW 
PCC TO INHERIT FROM THEIR FATHER'S ESTATE IF HE 
SATISFIES FOUR REQUIREMENTS DURING HIS 
LIFETIME. 
A. To Reconcile the Competing Interests a/the Legislature and 
PCC, After-Born Heirs Should be Entitled to Inherit from Their 
Deceased Parent in Certain Circumstances 
To advance the legislative goal of streamlining the estate 
administration process 128 while simultaneously effectuating the 
decedent's intent, PCC should only be entitled to inherit from the 
deceased parent's estate under limited circumstances. Maryland 
should authorize this presumption against inheritance by statute, 
declaring that PCC are not entitled to inherit from or through the 
decedent's estate unless he (1) completed a signed, witnessed writing 
at the time of the sperm donation, (2) consented to the posthumous 
reproduction, (3) unequivocally indicated intent to financially provide 
for that child, and (4) engaged in estate planning in order to create a 
source for that child's inheritance. 129 By demarcating assets for the 
after-born child's inheritance, the probate estate may be distributed 
and wrapped up in a timely manner. 130 
Such a strict inheritance statute would reconcile the competing 
interests of the legislature and other heirs, who desire an efficient 
estate administration process and protection of their inheritance, 
respectively,131 while protecting the PCC and preserving their ability 
to inherit. 132 Because the inheritance would be limited to funds set 
aside for the purpose of providing for the after-born child and probate 
assets would be off-limits, the personal representative could 
distribute the probate estate according to the terms of the decedent's 
will without interfering with the after-born's share. 133 
128. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105 (LexisNexis 2011). 
129. See discussion infra Part IV.B-E; supra Part ILA. 
130. See i'!fra Part IV.E. 
131. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257,264-66 (Mass. 2002). 
132. See supra Part lILA. 
133. See i'!fra Part IV.E. 
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B. A Written, Signed, and Witnessed Consent Form Completed at 
the Time of the Donation Would Demonstrate the Donor's Intent 
for the Specimens 
Current law permits a donor to furnish only a signed writing in 
order to comply with the statutory consent requirements. 134 However, 
the formalities imposed upon testators executing their wills are 
similarly necessary for men donating sperm as a contingency in the 
event of their death. 135 Requiring a signed, witnessed writing serves 
protective, ritual, evidentiary, and channeling functions. 136 Creating a 
physical record of the donor's wishes ensures the decedent's intent 
for the sperm specimens is known. 137 Additionally, the witnesses can 
be called to testify if the disposition of the specimens is contested. 138 
C. For a Posthumously Conceived Child to Inherit from the 
Deceased Father's Estate, the Donor Must Provide Written 
Consent for the Posthumous Reproduction to Occur 
Even if state law ultimately dictates the legal rights of after-born 
heirs,139 a consent form completed at the time of the donation allows 
the donor to make his intent regarding the ultimate disposition of the 
semen specimens known. 140 By allowing the donor to specify his 
intent for the specimens after his death, neither his family nor the 
courts are forced to speculate. 141 These consent forms are analogous 
to a transfer on death designation, creating a nonprobate arrangement 
whereby the specimens pass according to the contract terms. 142 
l34. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b), 20-111(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
The written records are not required to be witnessed.ld. §§ 3-107, 20-III(c). 
l35. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (LexisNexis 2011). 
l36. JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 225 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). Channeling refers to the use of standardized 
formalities to ensure that the instrument passes "efficiently through the legal system." 
ld. at 226. 
l37. See id. at 226. 
l38. See id. 
l39. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
140. See Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32. 
141. See id. at 2-3; Semen Specimen Use and Release Authorization, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, 
2 (Aug. 17,2010), http://www.fairfaxcryobank.comlforms.shtml. 
142. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 69; Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen 
Depositor Agreement, supra note 32. 
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Though spenu bank consent fonus vary in scope, most cover the 
disposition of the specimens upon the donor's death. 143 Some fonus 
require the donor to indicate whether the specimens should be 
destroyed or released to a named individual. 144 Others establish 
destruction of the specimens as the default, unless the donor provided 
a signed, written, and notarized statement indicating his intent for a 
child to be born posthumously and to transfer ownership of the 
specimens to a designee. 145 One agreement requires the donor to list 
the dates for which the cryopreservation agreement is effective; the 
semen is disposed of beyond the specified date. 146 The Fertility 
Center of California allows the donor to specify an individual, as well 
as that person's successor, to receive and make all decisions related 
to the specimen upon the donor's death. 147 
Despite these variations amongst the fonus, the donor's intent 
concerning posthumous reproduction will be ascertainable as long as 
he completes a consent fonu that indicates whether the specimens 
should be maintained for use by the designee or destroyed upon his 
death. The fonus thus allow the donor to satisfy or fail the second 
prong of the proposed statute at the time of the donation: the intent 
element is met if he transfers ownership of the specimens to his 
partner and consents to their use towards posthumous reproduction. 148 
However, the donor fails to express the requisite intent for the 
child's posthumous reproduction when he indicates that the 
specimens should be destroyed, or if the consent fonu is silene49 and 
143. See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 
32, at 2-3; Sperm Cryopreservation and Storage Agreement, UNIVERSITY WOMEN'S 
HEALTHCARE-FERTILITY CENTER, http://www.university 
womenshealthcare.comlinfertility/patients/sperm-cryopreservation-agreement.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 11,2012). 
144. See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 
32, at 2-3. 
145. See, e.g., id. 
146. Consent/Agreement for Cryopreservation and Storage of Semen, SPERM BANK OF 
CALIFORNIA, http://www.spermbankcalifomia.comlmediaiConsentAgreement-for-
Cryopreservation-and-Storage-of-Semen I.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2012). 
147. Ultimate Disposition of Semen Specimens, SPERM BANK OF CALIFORNIA, 
http://spermbankcalifornia.comlmedialUltirnate-Disposition-of-Semen-
Specimens l.pdf (last visited Dec. 11,2012). 
148. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); e.g., Patient 
Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, at 2-3; see 
also Woodward v. Cornm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002). 
149. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269 (citing Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the 
Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 901, 951 (1997)). 
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does not bequeath the specimens to a designated recipient. ISO 
Consequently, the posthumously conceived child would be barred 
from inheriting from the decedent's estate. 151 
D. To Ensure the Posthumously Conceived Child Is Eligiblefor 
Inheritance Benefits, the Donor Must Unequivocally State His 
Intent to Financially Provide for that Child 
Under current Maryland law, the donor must consent to be the 
parent of the posthumously conceived child; 152 however, the legal 
implications of this requirement are ambiguous in light of the fact 
that PCC are only conceived after the donor's death, never knowing 
their father and without any chance of a traditional parent-child 
relationship. In fact, consent forms generally contain a waiver 
exempting the donor from legal obligations with respect to the 
resulting child, and instead, the person who purchases the donated 
sperm and conceives from the specimen becomes "solely responsible 
for [the child's] support and custody.,,153 If a donor wants to ensure 
his posthumously conceived child is provided for, he would need to 
proactively indicate his desire to financially support the child. 154 For 
example, some centers explicitly address posthumous reproduction in 
their agreements: 
A client may become a biological parent after his death .... 
For a client to be recognized as the legal parent of a future 
child, there must be a written and notarized statement signed 
by the client during his lifetime stating he intends to parent 
after his death and granting ownership of stored specimen to 
a designee. Ownership of the specimens, with the authority 
to control the use of the stored specimen will transfer to the 
designee, according to the wishes expressed by the client 
depositor. Ownership or use of the specimens after the 
client depositor's death does not automatically grant legal 
status to the child that the client depositor is the father. 
150. See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 
32; supra Part IV.A. 
151. See supra Part IV.A. 
152. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(2). 
153. Terms of Use, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, 2 (June I, 2012), 
http://www.fairfaxcryobank.comldocumentsIDISAOp.IOFFXTermsofUse _ WEB _DS. 
pdf. The form states, "The donor has given up all of his rights and is released from 
any obligations to children born using his sperm." Id. 
154. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269; Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen 
Depositor Agreement, supra note 32. 
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Without the client's written declaration of intent to parent, 
the child would not be afforded legal rights of inheritance or 
support. PRIOR TO USING THE SPECIMEN, PLEASE 
CONSULT WITH AN EXPERIENCED ATTORNEY 
REGARDING THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE 
OR SUPPORT OF A CHILD BORN AFTER THE 
DEPOSITOR'S DEATH.155 
This model consent fonn acknowledges the need for a fonnal, 
written statement that expresses the donor's intent to father a child 
posthumously and bequeaths the specimen to a designated 
recipient. 156 However, the fonn defers the issue of the posthumously 
conceived child's inheritance, thus exemplifying the need to clarify 
this part of the law. 157 
While the forms establish a default that removes the donor from 
liability for the child, and therefore, create a sufficient waiver for 
heterologous inseminations, donors in homologous inseminations can 
draft around this standard language by unequivocally expressing the 
intent to financially support the child. 158 The donor can accomplish 
this at the time of the donation, and a consent fonn that complies with 
the statutory fonnalities may confinn the donor's desire to provide 
pecuniary support in addition to providing dispositive instructions for 
the stored specimens. 159 Requiring the donor to consent in a written 
record to provide financial support to the posthumously conceived 
child adds precision to the current statutory language, which is 
undefined and fails to explain the effect, if any, of consenting to be 
the parent of the child. 160 
155. Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, at 2 
(emphasis added). 
156. !d. In the case of homologous insemination using a stored embryo, the specimen 
could automatically pass to the survivor upon the donor's death. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
SOC. SEC., supra note 95, at 37-38,56,85. This effectively gives nonprobate status to 
the specimen so that upon the death of one owner, the property passes automatically 
to the survivor by operation of law. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 18, 23. 
However, this recommendation was specifically based on stored embryos, in which 
both the man and the woman in the couple have a vested interest. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
Soc. SEC., supra note 95, at 37-38,56,85. The issue at bar is distinguishable because 
when the stored specimen is limited to sperm, the woman does not yet have an 
ownership interest in the gametic material. See id. 
157. See Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, 
at 2. 
158. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269; Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen 
Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, at 2; Terms o/Use, supra note 153, at 1-2. 
159. See discussion supra Part IV.A-C. 
160. See MD. CODE ANN., EST & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
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E. Granting Inheritance Rights to PCC Will Only Be 
Administratively Feasible if the Decedent Engaged in Estate 
Planning During His Lifetime and Created a Source of Funds for 
the After-Born Child's Inheritance 
Even if the donor meets the two-fold consent requirement, allowing 
pee to inherit from the probate estate does not eliminate several 
problems, such as: (1) determining the amount of assets to be 
reserved for the child; (2) allowing the personal representative to 
proceed with distributing the remainder of the estate; (3) protecting 
the inheritance of the decedent's other children; or (4) guaranteeing 
the posthumously conceived child will receive an inheritance at all if 
born beyond the statute of limitations period. '61 These uncertainties 
would be removed under the statute proposed by this comment if 
Maryland requires the decedent to engage in estate planning during 
his lifetime, such that the after-born heir would have an inheritance 
reserved in the form of an inter vivos or testamentary truSt. 162 For 
example, the donor could bequeath his residuary estate in trust to his 
wife for life and then to his children. To further ensure that the 
donor's intent is carried out with respect to supporting the after-born 
child, the definitional section of the trust should expressly stipulate 
that any reference to "child," "children," "descendant," or 
"descendants," however expressed, shall be construed to include any 
legitimate descendants, including a child or descendant conceived 
after the donor's death. 163 
Imposing a statutory requirement that any pee inherit from a 
nonprobate source of assets also obviates the need to either amend 
the statute of limitations pertaining to the closing of an estate,l64 or 
impose a statute of limitations within which time the pee must be 
born in order to inherit. 165 To maintain an efficient system where the 
estate is wrapped up within a maximum timeframe, a statute of 
161. See id. at § 3-107(B)(3); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 1O-103(b){l) (LexisNexis 
2011); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259; discussion supra Part lILA. 
162. In Maryland, a trust established for the benefit of the unborn child would not violate 
the rule against perpetuities as long as the trust document states that the rule against 
perpetuities does not apply and the trustee has power to dispose of the property "for 
any period of time beyond the period that is required for an interest ... to vest." EST. 
& TRUSTS § 11-102(b)(5). 
163. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 101-02. 
164. See EST. & TRUSTS § 10-103(b)(1) (establishing a statute of limitations with respect to 
closing estates). 
165. See EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(3). 
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limitations should exist beyond which claims are barred. 166 
Currently, the personal representative will be "discharged from any 
claim or demand of any interested person" if the fiduciary is not 
involved with any pending action one year after the estate is closed. 167 
Claims regarding the improper distribution of property, however, 
must be brought within three years of the decedent's death or one 
year from the time of the distribution of property, whichever is 
later. 168 The purpose of this law is the timely resolution of the estate, 
prompt devolution of the property to the heirs, and the preservation of 
assets for those children already alive and entitled to take under the 
decedent's will or the laws of intestacy.169 Making the probate assets 
off-limits in satisfying the after-born child's share would allow the 
personal representative to proceed with administering the estate and 
distributing assets to other beneficiaries without infringing on their 
shares. 170 
Some might argue this short time frame of three years should be 
increased. 171 First, specimens can remain viable for upwards of ten 
years.172 The surviving partner should not be pressured to conceive 
immediately, especially while still mourning her partner's death.173 
Alternatively, the woman may have difficulty conceiving and be 
unable to become pregnant within the statute of limitations period. 174 
The two-year period mandated in the current after-born heirs statute 
fails to acknowledge these considerations. 175 But the problem of 
keeping the estate open indefinitely in order to reserve assets for the 
inheritance of an after-born child, who could be born upwards of ten 
years after the decedent's death, becomes a non-issue if the 
inheritance originates from a truSt. 176 Under the proposal set forth in 
this comment, the current statute oflimitations can remain in force, 177 
and the probate estate can be settled immediately without sacrificing 
the after-born child's inheritance. It also preserves the protective 
feature of the statute of limitations by preventing the existing 
166. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ l-105(a), 10-103; Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 59 (4th Cir. 
2011); In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
167. EST. & TRUSTS § 10-103(a)(I). 
168. Id. at § 1O-103(b)(l). 
169. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59; In re Estate afKalacy, 753 A.2d at 1262. 
170. In re Estate of Kalacy, 753 A.2d at 1262. 
171. See EST. & TRUSTS § 1O-103(b)(1 )(i). 
172. In re Estate of Kalaey, 753 A.2d at 1261. 
173. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 268 (Mass. 2002). 
174. Id. 
175. See Mo. CooEANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
176. See In re Estate afKalacy, 753 A.2d at 1261-62. 
177. Mo. CooEANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1O-103(b)(l)(LexisNexis 2011). 
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children, either beneficiaries under the will or heirs under the laws of 
intestacy, from receiving reduced benefits due to the subsequent 
births of the PCc. 178 By statutorily requiring the donor to create an 
estate plan that includes an inter vivos or testamentary trust, whether 
the after-born child is entitled to inherit and whether a source for the 
inheritance exists will be known at the donor's death. Further, since 
the inheritance is reserved in trust, the current statute of limitations 
can remain in effect, thereby ensuring the timely resolution of the 
estate. 179 
V. CONCLUSION 
After losing their husbands to cancer, a heart attack, and leukemia, 
respectively, Gayle Bums, Janice Schafer, and Patti Beeler all 
conceived with the sperm their husbands banked prior to receiving 
medical treatment. 180 For these women, and those like them who will 
apply for and be denied social security benefits for their PCC in the 
months and years ahead, state intestacy laws have become a 
disastrous focal point of courts' decisions. 181 
To keep pace with the advancements in reproductive technologies, 
Maryland should further amend its current after-born heirs statute so 
as not to preclude a growing class of children from receiving 
inheritance benefits from their deceased fathers. 182 The amended law 
should create a presumption against inheritance for children 
conceived posthumously from their father's banked sperm. 183 In 
order for PCC to be entitled to inherit as heirs of their father's 
probate estate or as class members described in the will or trust of the 
decedent or one of his relative's, the child's parent or guardian must 
produce the decedent's signed, witnessed writing; a consent form 
completed at the time of the donation would satisfy this statutory 
requirement. 184 The writing must express the donor's unequivocal 
intent for the posthumous reproduction to occur and the intent to 
provide pecuniary support for the child. 185 This witnessed writing 
178. See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49,59 (4th Cir. 2011); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266. 
179. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ 7-101, 1O-103(b)(1); supra notes 165-167 and accompanying 
text. 
180. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956-57; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Dobner, supra note 
1. 
181. SeesupraPartII.C. 
182. See supra Part II. 
183. See supra Part IV.A. 
184. See supra Part IV.B. 
185. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002); supra 
Part IV.C-D. 
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requirement will minimize fraudulent claims and prevent prolonged 
proceedings whereby extrinsic evidence is needed to prove the 
decedent's intent. 186 Lastly, the decedent must have engaged in estate 
planning during his lifetime, creating a trust to protect the after-born 
child's inheritance. 187 Without a source of funds reserved for the 
posthumously conceived child, the child's right to inherit will be 
void. 188 By prohibiting pee from accessing probate assets, the 
personal representative can continue to administer the estate in a 
timely manner, and the inheritance of the decedent's other heirs 
remains protected. 189 
Although this solution expands the inheritance rights of pee, the 
restrictive nature of the proposed statute ensures that pee are not 
receiving a financial windfall every time a widow chooses to have a 
child using her deceased husband's banked semen. 190 Only when a 
donor has taken calculated steps to ensure his after-born child is 
financially supported will the child have a claim to an inheritance. 191 
By avoiding a bright-line rule that either allows or denies inheritance 
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